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ILLINOIS V. LIDSTER: CONTINUING TO
CARVE OUT CONSTITUTIONAL VEHICLE
CHECKPOINTS
I. INTRODUCTION

In Illinois v. Lidster,1 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit motorist checkpoints carried out with the
purpose of requesting information from vehicle occupants about a
previously-committed crime.2 The Court deemed such stops to be
constitutional when they advance the public interest in solving a crime to a
degree that3 outweighs any interference with individual liberties as a result
of the stop.

This Note argues that the Supreme Court properly reasoned that its
decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,4 in which the Court held
unconstitutional checkpoints conducted without any individualized
suspicion and "to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," 5 is
distinguishable from Lidster and should not control. The Supreme Court
was correct in reasoning that a lack of individualized suspicion is not fully
'determinative of an informational stop's constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment. Further, the Supreme Court was consistent in holding that
special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify such stops, as the
Court had previously articulated in Michigan Departmentof State Police v.
Sitz6 and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.7 Finally, the Supreme Court
properly held that the reasonableness of the checkpoint stop in Lidsterand, thus, its constitutionality-should be determined by applying the
balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas.8 However, this Note also argues
540 U.S. 419 (2004).
2 Id. at 424.

Id. at 427.

4 531 U.S. 32 (2000).

' Id.at 41-42.
6 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
' 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976).
8 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426-27 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)).

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 95

that although the Supreme Court used the proper analysis in finding that
these types of checkpoints are not per se unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court erred in engaging in the balancing test to decide Lidster. Instead, it
should have remanded the case to the Illinois courts to decide whether the
facts of the case satisfied Brown's multifactor test.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
9
seized.

It is well established that a vehicle checkpoint stop is a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, just as stopping a pedestrian on the
street is considered a seizure. 10 In cases involving such checkpoints, the
question that then arises is whether those seizures are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. When a seizure is less intrusive than a formal arrest,
courts balance "the amount of intrusion upon individual privacy against the
special law enforcement interests that would be served by permitting such
an intrusion" in order to determine whether it is reasonable and thus does
not require some element of suspicion in order to be constitutional.12 While
some amount of individualized suspicion is generally required in a
constitutional seizure, "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of such suspicion.' 3 When the public interest concerns
advanced by a seizure outweigh the interference with individual liberties as
a result of the seizure, the seizure is constitutional even in the absence of
any degree of individualized suspicion. 14 Conversely, if the balancing test

9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450; Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (noting that

a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs "when there is a governmental termination of freedom
of movement through means intentionally applied');Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 556. As
applied to vehicle checkpoints, drivers are intentionally constrained in their ability to use the
roads as they ordinarily would by law enforcement officials. Further, as noted in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., "[t]he fact that automobiles occupy a special category in Fourth Amendment
case law is now beyond doubt.
436 U.S. 307, 315 n.10 (1978).
"' Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
12 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514-15 (1983).
13 Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 560-61.
14 See id.
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falls in favor 15of individual liberties, a suspicionless seizure is
unconstitutional.
The following cases outline the Supreme Court's assessment of
seizures employed in a variety of circumstances, including vehicle
checkpoints. First, in UnitedStates v. Martinez-Fuerte,the Supreme Court
weighed public interest concerns against intrusions on individual liberties in
finding vehicle checkpoints set up to assist with border control efforts
constitutional. 16 Then, in Brown v. Texas, the Court formally set forth a
balancing test to be used in determining the reasonableness of suspicionless
seizures. 17 Next, the Court applied the Brown test in Michigan Department
of State Police v. Sitz in holding that sobriety checkpoints executed without
any individualized suspicion of the drivers were constitutional. 18
Then, in City of Indianapolisv. Edmond, the Supreme Court held that
suspicionless checkpoints conducted for the purpose of general crime
control were unconstitutional. 19 In this case, there was no use for the
was factually
Brown balancing test because the checkpoint at issue
20
distinguishable from those in Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz.
A. THE SUPREME COURT FINDS CHECKPOINTS TO ASSIST WITH
BORDER CONTROL CONSTITUTIONAL IN UNITED STATES V.
MARTINEZ-FUERTE
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court considered
several consolidated cases that had been decided by the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits. 2 ' In those cases, the original defendants were individuals arrested
at permanent checkpoints set up along roads that led away from U.S. border
crossings with Mexico.22 At these stops, located not at border crossings,
but generally within 100 miles from the border on major highways
frequently traveled by vehicles coming from the border, officials slowed or
15See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
16 428 U.S. at 543.
17443 U.S. at 47.
18 496 U.S. 444,444 (1990).
19 531 U.S. 32, 32 (2000).
20 Id. at 42-43.
21 428 U.S. at 545-51. This case resolved a circuit split on the issue. The Ninth Circuit
had previously found that checkpoints of this nature were unconstitutional, while the Fifth
Circuit had found them to be constitutional. Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514
F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975), with United States v. Sifuentes, 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1975). In
finding that the checkpoints were constitutional, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit decisions and reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decisions. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 567.
22 Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 545-51.
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stopped all traffic. 2 3 Each vehicle was visually inspected and those that
were determined to require additional inquiry were directed to pull out of
the traffic flow. 24 In some circumstances, officials who determined vehicles
25
'
required additional inquiry did so without any "articulable suspicion.
Each of the original defendants had been arrested for transporting illegal
26
aliens, discovered upon further inquiry at their respective checkpoints.
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court considered whether
reasonable suspicion was "a prerequisite to a valid stop" by balancing the
interests at stake.27 The Court put great weight on the public interest of
operating routine stops, because controlling the inflow of illegal aliens was
an important concern and could not be accomplished at the border crossings
alone.28 It reasoned that requiring reasonable suspicion in order to stop a
car would be "impractical," because too many vehicles traveled on the
roads to allow "particularized study" of each one. 29 The Supreme Court
also found that vehicle occupants' Fourth Amendment rights were intruded
upon in a very limited way. 30 The court considered both the objective
intrusion on individuals' Fourth Amendment interests, as well as the
subjective intrusion.3 1 From the objective perspective, the vast majority of
vehicles were detained very briefly and the seizure itself (that is, the
preliminary checkpoint inspection) was limited to a visual inspection of
only that which could be seen from the outside of the car.32 The subjective
intrusion--"the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful
travelers"-was also not great at a checkpoint stop. 33 Thus, even without
articulable suspicion, the government interests in operating the checkpoints
outweighed those of the private citizen.34
In holding that permanent checkpoints to screen for illegal aliens were
constitutional even in the absence of individualized suspicion, the Supreme
Id. at 546.
id
25 Id.at 547.
26 Id.at 547-50.
27 Id.at 556.
28Id.at 556-57.
29 Id at 557.
30 Id.at 557-58.
31Id at 558.
23

24

Id.
33Id.In this case, the Supreme Court compared the subjective intrusion of checkpoint
32

stops to the subjective intrusion of "roving patrols"--customs officials who generally
patrolled secondary roads around border crossing and pulled over vehicles at random to
check for illegal aliens. Id.
(quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)).
34Id.at 561.
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Court noted that the expectation of privacy in a car is appreciably less than
such expectation during a search of one's person or belongings, or while in
one's residence.35 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision
and remanded the individual Ninth Circuit cases.36
B. A BALANCING TEST FOR REASONABLENESS IS ESTABLISHED IN
BROWN V. TEXAS
The Supreme Court's first direct articulation of the appropriate test by
which the reasonableness of seizures should be determined appeared in its
unanimous opinion in Brown v. Texas:
The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends
on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference by law officers. Consideration of the constitutionality
of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the
37
severity of the interference with individual liberty.

In Brown, two patrolling police officers saw the defendant as he
walked away from another individual in an alley.38 The police officers did
not suspect him of any specific misconduct or of being armed. 39 However,
they stopped the defendant, and demanded that he identify himself, and
explain what he was doing in the alley.40 The defendant refused to identify
himself, and the police arrested him under a provision in the Texas penal
code that deems failure to provide one's name when lawfully requested by a
police officer a criminal act.4 1 The defendant claimed that the police
officers' seizure of him-here, the short seizure when they detained him on
the street-violated the Fourth Amendment, and as such he was wrongfully
arrested.42 The officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the
defendant, so the Court in deciding the case considered the public interest
concerns at stake, the degree to which they were advanced by detaining the
43
defendant, and the defendant's right to personal security and privacy.
Here, the public interest concerns (prevention of crime) were great, and the
Texas statute under which the defendant had been stopped may have been
31 Id. at 561-62.
36

Id. at 567.

"7 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (citations omitted).
38 Id. at 48.
3 Id. at 49.
40 Id. at 48-49.
41 Id. at 49.
42 See id.
4' Id at 52.
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designed to advance those concerns. 44 However, to demand that any
individual identify himself even when he is not suspected of having
committed any criminal activity was found to be arbitrary and at risk of
abuse. 45 Thus, the Court found that the balance "tilt[ed] in favor of freedom
from police interference" and held that the statute as applied violated the
Fourth Amendment.4 6
C. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OFPOLICE V. SITZ SETS FORTH
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHECKPOINTS TO SCREEN FOR
INTOXICATED DRIVERS
In Michigan Department of Police v. Sitz, 47 the Supreme Court
considered whether Michigan's use of sobriety checkpoints violated the
Fourth Amendment.48 The checkpoints were part of a pilot program run by
the state police department.49 State police officers, operating checkpoints
set up at selected sites along state roads, would stop all vehicles passing
through and briefly examine the drivers for signs of intoxication. ° If such
signs were detected, those cars would be directed out of the traffic flow for
an inspection of the driver's license and registration and, if necessary,
additional sobriety tests. 51 The trial and appellate courts had utilized the
Brown balancing test to determine that the use of sobriety checkpoints
generally was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 52 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that while the Brown balancing test was the appropriate
53
test to use, the lower courts had misapplied several elements of the test.
First, the Supreme Court noted that the Michigan courts, in weighing
the balance between the public interest in combating drunk driving and the
intrusion on private individuals' Fourth Amendment rights, put improper
emphasis on what they perceived to be the subjective intrusion on drivers.54
The Michigan courts had found the subjective intrusion to be substantial on
the basis that the checkpoints had the potential to generate great fear and

441id
45 Id.
46

id.

4'
41

496 U.S. 444 (1990).
Id at 447.

49 id.

Id.
id.
52 Id. at 448-49.
53 Id. at 450-55.
14 Id. at 452.
50
51
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surprise, and, thus, were unreasonable. 5 The Supreme Court found that the
lower courts had misread precedent cases and had considered the fear and
surprise that would be generated in a driver who had been drinking.56
Instead, the Supreme Court clarified that the fear and surprise to be
considered is that of a law-abiding driver.57
The Supreme Court also held that the Michigan courts had improperly
considered the "effectiveness" of the checkpoint program as part of its
balancing analysis. 58 The Michigan courts, relying on empirical testimony
presented at trial,59 concluded that the checkpoint program did not satisfy
the effectiveness element of the test, and this failure "materially discounted
[the State's] strong interest in implementing the program. 60 The Supreme
Court instead found that the language from Brown upon which the
Michigan courts based their effectiveness evaluation ("the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest 61) was never intended to make the
courts the decision-makers in determining among reasonable law
enforcement techniques, nor was it supported by any of the precedent cases
cited by the Michigan courts.62 It held that "for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding
of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite
number of police officers. 6 3
Finding that the balance of Michigan's interest in preventing drunken
driving, the extent to which the checkpoint program could reasonably be
found to advance that interest, and the intrusion upon drivers who are
stopped at the checkpoints weighed in favor of the program, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case.64

55 id.
56
57

58

id.
id.
Id.at 453.

59Id.at 454-55.
60 Id.at 453.
61 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
62 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54.
63 id.
64Id.at 455.
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D. THE IMPACT OF INDIANAPOLIS V.EDMOND IN DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS

In November 2000, after the parties' briefs were filed in Lidster's
appeal to the Illinois appellate court and before that court's decision,65 the
Supreme Court decided City of Indianapolisv. Edmond.6 6 In Edmond, the

Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether highway checkpoints with
the primary purpose of "discovery and interdiction" of vehicle passengers
possessing illegal narcotics were constitutional.67
In 1998, the city of Indianapolis began a program in which vehicle
68
checkpoints were set up on city roads to check for unlawful drugs.
Approximately thirty police officers manned each checkpoint. 69 The stop
operated by pulling over a group of passing cars for processing. 70 The rest
of the traffic on the road would proceed as usual until examinations of all of
the stopped cars were completed. 71 At least one officer would approach
each vehicle, inform the driver that he or she was being stopped for a drug
checkpoint and ask for his or her license and registration.72 The officer
would screen for signs of impairment and conduct a visual inspection of the
car from outside. 73 A narcotics-detection dog would be walked around the
perimeter of each vehicle.74 Officers were only allowed to conduct any
further searches by consent
or with an "appropriate quantum of
75
particularized suspicion.

The original plaintiffs in the case consisted of a class of drivers who
had been stopped or were "subject to being stopped in the future" at the
checkpoints. 7 They claimed that the roadblocks violated the Fourth
Amendment.77 At trial, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana held that the checkpoints did not violate the Fourth
65

Lidster was convicted by the Circuit Court, Du Page County in 1997. The parties filed

their briefs in Lidster's appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District in early Fall
of 2000. Lidster's appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District was decided on
March 30, 2001. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
66 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
67 Id.at 34.
68

id.

69

Id. at35.

70

id.

71Id. at 36.
72 Id. at
73 id.

35.

74/id.

75Id.
76

Id. at 36.

77id.
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Amendment.78 On appeal, a sharply divided panel for the United State
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and found that the
checkpoints were in fact a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 79 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision, noting that it had
"never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing., 80 In holding that the
checkpoints in Edmond violated the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
declined "to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion
where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary
enterprise of investigating crimes., 81 The Supreme Court specified that its
previous checkpoint cases "recognized only limited exceptions to the
general rule that a seizure
must be accompanied by some measure of
'82
individualized suspicion.
The Supreme Court compared Edmond to its holding in Sitz and found
that the narcotics-interdiction purpose of the checkpoints could not be
83
rationalized in terms of a highway safety concern as was present in Sitz.
Rather, the Sitz checkpoint sought to eliminate a class of offenses that
presented an "immediate, vehicle-bound 84
threat to life and limb," and such a
Edmond.
in
supported
be
not
claim could
Additionally, the rationale applied in Martinez-Fuertedid not support
the Indianapolis checkpoint program.85 While the city of Indianapolis
likened its anti-contraband purpose to the anti-smuggling rationale for
checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, the Indianapolis program lacked a
counterpart for the border context present in the precedent case.8 6 That is,
both checkpoint systems may have logically connected to the impracticality
87
of giving particularized study to each car because of traffic flow concerns.
However, there was no connection between the checkpoints in Edmond and
proximity to contraband production or importation as there had been such a
"crucial" connection between the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte and
proximity to the U.S. border.88

78 id.
79 id.

'0Id.
at41.

" Id.
at 44.
82 Id. at41.
" Id.at 43.

86

id.
id.
id.

87

Id.

84

85

88 Id.
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In finding the Indianapolis checkpoint program unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court reiterated that its holding in no way changed the
constitutional status of its previous checkpoint holdings in Sitz and
Martinez-Fuerte, and in those cases, constitutionality still depended on a
balancing of the competing interests at stake.8 9
III. ILLINOIS V.LIDSTER: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Early on Saturday morning, August 23, 1997, Joseph L. Pytel, a
seventy-year-old postal worker, began the fifteen-mile trip to his home in
Maywood, Illinois, from a U.S. Postal Service sorting facility in Carol
Stream, Illinois, on his bicycle.90 Although he could drive, most days Pytel
chose to ride his bicycle for exercise. 91 While riding on the eastbound
92
shoulder of Highway 64 in Lombard, Illinois, Pytel was struck by a car.
The driver of the vehicle left the scene without identifying himself.93 Pytel
was pronounced dead upon arrival via ambulance at a local hospital.94 Two
days later, Lombard police had no specific leads, other than a description
of
95
either a Ford Bronco or a pick-up truck involved in the accident.
In an effort to obtain more information about the driver of the vehicle
that hit and killed Pytel, Lombard police decided to set up an informative
stop the following Saturday morning along the same stretch of road where
the accident occurred and around the same time that the accident took
place.96
Police cars with flashing lights partially blocked the eastbound lanes of [Highway 64].
The blockage forced traffic to slow down, leading to lines of up to 15 cars in each
lane. As each vehicle drew up to the checkpoint, an officer would stop it for 10 to 15
seconds, ask the occupants whether they had seen anything happen there the previous
weekend, and hand each driver a flyer9 [that requested assistance in identifying the
vehicle and driver that killed Mr. Pytel].

In addition to operating the roadblock around the same time as the
accident, the police considered the fact that the time of the accident also
coincided with shift changes at some businesses in nearby industrial
'9 Id at 47.
9 William Grady, Joseph L. Pytel, 70, Postal Worker, CHI. Tm., Aug. 25, 1997, § 2, at

5.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004).
94 Grady, supranote 90.
95 People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ill. 2002).
96 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422; Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 856; People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d
419, 421 (111. App. Ct. 2001).
97 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422.
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complexes. 98 They hypothesized that this might result in not only an
increase in regular traffic on the road at that hour but also an increased
possibility of locating motorists who had been on the road at the same time
the previous week. 99
Robert Lidster, the manager of a pet store in the nearby community of
Villa Park,'0 0 approached the roadblock in a minivan. 1°1 A police officer
handed him a leaflet and allowed him to pass. 10 2 At that time, Detective
Wayne Vasil was standing in the center lane of the highway while handing
out flyers to other stopped cars.10 3 He was wearing an orange reflective
vest with the word "Police" on it.'0 4 As Lidster pulled away from the
roadblock, he swerved and almost hit Detective Vasil. 10 5 Detective Vasil
approached Lidster's car to inquire as to why Lidster had nearly hit him
with his car.106 Detective Vasil, though unaware that Lidster had violated
any state law or city ordinance, thought that "something might be
wrong,"'10 7 so he requested Lidster's license and insurance card.' 0 8
During his conversation with Lidster, Detective Vasil smelled alcohol
on Lidster's breath and noticed that Lidster's speech was slurred.' 0 9 In

response, Detective Vasil directed Lidster to pull over onto a side street. 1 O
There, another detective with the Lombard police, Roy Newton, had Lidster
perform several sobriety tests and subsequently arrested Lidster for driving
under the influence of alcohol."'
At trial, Lidster moved to quash his arrest, arguing that the roadblock
in Lombard was unconstitutional.1 2 The court denied the motion and a jury
found Lidster guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol."13 The trial

98

Id

99 Id.

100Christy Gutowski, A Bad Month for One Drunken Driver, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Jan.

28, 2004, at 13.
'0Lidaster, 540 U.S. at 422.
102Stacy St. Clair, DUI Tossed Out Over Lombard's Use of Roadblock, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Apr. 25, 2001, at 3.
103

People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ill. 2002).

104

Id.

105Id.
106

People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 419,421 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001).

107Id.

108Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 856.
109 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004).
110

Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 856.

d.;
Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421.
Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 856; Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421.
113id.
'I

112
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court sentenced Lidster to one year of conditional discharge, and required
that he participate in counseling, complete fourteen days in the "Sheriffs
Work Alternative Program" and pay a $200 fine.' 14 Lidster appealed on the
grounds that the roadblock was unconstitutional." 5
A. THE IMPACT OF CITY OFINDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND ON THE ILLINOIS
APPELLATE COURT DECISION
When Lidster appealed his conviction to the appellate court in Illinois,
he argued that the balancing test weighed in favor of the intrusion on
private individuals over the public interest. 1 6 The appellate court, in
considering Lidster's claim, noted that although the Lombard roadblock
was in some ways different from the one at issue in Edmond, it was
"impossible to escape the conclusion that the roadblock's ostensible
purpose was to see evidence of 'ordinary criminal wrongdoing."' 1 17 The
court went on to note that although Edmond allows for the possibility of
"emergency" checkpoints, no such emergency was present in the instant
of
case. 1 18 The Lombard police were simply looking for a better description
9
him."
catch
to
expecting
even
not
and
hit-and-run
the
the driver in
Additionally, the appellate court reasoned that per Edmond, the use of
checkpoints for "the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes" allowed
for no theoretical limit on when such tactics could be employed and when
the requirement of individualized suspicion would be nullified, as well as
the possibility of police subterfuge. 120 Accordingly, the appellate court
posited that if the roadblock employed in Lidster's case could be justified
on the basis of aiding the investigation of a crime, it would effectively
allow police to use roadblocks "virtually every day on the chance that
'2
someone might have seen something that would aid the investigation.' 1 '
The appellate court also viewed the fact that police officers were present to
ensure that drivers did not evade the roadblock as indicative that the
intentions behind the checkpoint were not necessarily only to seek
114

Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 857.

115 Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421.
116 Id.
117

Id. at 422.

118Id. In Edmond, the Supreme Court hypothesized circumstances under which the

requirement of reasonable suspicion might be waived in justifying checkpoints designed to
generally prevent criminal activity. Among them, it listed responding to the imminent threat
of a terrorist attack and catching a dangerous criminal who is anticipated or likely to flee "by
way of a particular route." 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
119 Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 422.
120 Id. at 422 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44).
121 Id.
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information-if they were, drivers would not find it necessary to attempt to
avoid the 122roadblock and, thus, such additional officers would not be
necessary.
The appellate court also looked to Edmond to determine that "a
criminal investigation can never be the basis for a roadblock, at least absent
some emergency circumstance not present [in the Lombard roadblock].' 2 3
The court reasoned that even if the police took every possible step to
minimize the intrusion on the motorists, the interest in using the roadblock
to assist in a criminal investigation would never be strong enough to
24
outweigh even the most minimal intrusion.
With that rationale, the appellate court reversed Lidster's conviction on
the basis that the roadblock
set up by the police in Lombard violated the
25
Fourth Amendment. 1
B. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN ON EDMOND IN ITS
DECISION
1. The Majority Opinion
The State of Illinois appealed the appellate court's reversal to the
Illinois Supreme Court.1 26 At the outset of its majority opinion, the court
reprised the appellate court's holding that the investigation into the hit-andrun accident in Lombard was "the type of routine investigative work that
the police must do every day and does not justify the extraordinary means
127
chosen to further the investigation.'
The State, in its appeal, contended that Edmond was distinguishable
from the instant case and that the Lombard roadblock did not constitute
such "every day" police work. 28 Rather than looking for information about
a crime not yet known to the police, the roadblock in Lombard had the
specific purpose of assisting authorities in solving a crime that had already
been committed. 29 Since the hit-and-run accident was known to the police
and was the specific reason for the checkpoint, the checkpoint was not

122
123
124

Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
id.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 419.

127 People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ill. 2002) (quoting Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at

422).

128 Id. at
129

Id.

858-59.
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directed at "general crime control. 1 30 Additionally, the State argued that
there was a distinction between stopping the driver of a car to gather
information as to whether he or she as the perpetrator of a crime, and
stopping a driver to gather information leading
to the identification of a
31
different driver as the perpetrator of a crime.'
The court found the State's assertions incorrect in four ways., 32 First,
the court found that the facts of the instant case did not fall within the scope
of the "limited exceptions" to the general rule requiring individualized
suspicion in reasonable searches or seizures, as outlined in Martinez-Fuerte
and Sitz. 133 Because the Lombard roadblock did not involve either the

border or sobriety checkpoints approved by the Supreme Court in those
cases, the roadblock could not be justified without individualized
suspicion. 34 Second, Edmond drew "a bright line that when the primary
purpose of a roadblock [was] general crime control, the roadblock [was]
unconstitutional.', 135 On the basis of these two points, the court concluded
that the State's assertions contravened the holding in Edmond.136 The court
could not follow the State's reasoning-doing so would uphold the
constitutionality of the Lombard roadblock based on criteria 37that the
Supreme Court had considered unconstitutional in previous cases. 1
Third, the court found that the State's distinction between gathering
information from drivers about themselves or about other drivers untenable
to delineate between "general crime control" and otherwise. 138 Regardless
of whether the police are inquiring about an individual's involvement in a
crime or an individual's knowledge of someone involved in a crime, the
court reasoned, these activities all fall within the context of "general crime
control., 13 9 Fourth, the court stated that making an exception for
informational roadblocks has the potential to make roadblocks "a routine
part of American life.' 140 The court described the "troubling specter" of the
streets of Chicago, adorned
with roadblocks as a result of a ruling in favor
14
of the state of Illinois.
130

Id.

131Id. at 859.
132

Id. at 859-60.

"' Id. at 859.
Id.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
134
135

138

Id. at 859-60.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 860 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000)).

141 Id.
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Further, the court noted that although the State had not argued that the
roadblock was due to emergency purposes, the Illinois Association of
Chiefs of Police had filed an amicus brief raising this consideration.142 The
court mentioned this line of argument, but declined to consider that an
emergency justified the use of the roadblock. 143 The court cited the length
of time since the accident (the roadblock took place one week after Mr.
Pytel had been killed). 144 It also pointed out that there was no indication the
hit-and-run driver posed a145further threat to the community, or even
remained in the community.
For these reasons, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the appellate court, and held that the Lombard roadblock
was
46
1
Edmond.
in
decision
Court's
Supreme
the
per
unconstitutional,
2. The Dissent
Three judges dissented in the Illinois Supreme Court decision. 47 First,
the dissent pointed out that Edmond was factually distinguishable from the
instant case in its "nature, purpose, and scope.' '148 Where Edmond involved
a roadblock that detained drivers on average between two and five minutes,
the Lombard roadblock detained drivers just long enough to hand out a
flyer, which took between ten and fifteen seconds. 149 Drivers were required
to produce a license and registration in Edmond; this was not required at the
Lombard roadblock. 150 Additionally, police in Edmond conducted a visual
inspection of the vehicles, which were also inspected by a narcotics5' Neither of these elements
detection dog.'
was present at the Lombard
52
roadblock.1
Further, Edmond should not have been determinative in the instant
case. 153 The dissent argued that the majority had focused on the wrong
language - rather than turning the case on whether the roadblock was
designed for "general crime control," the court should have instead
142
143

id.
Id.

144 id.
145

Id.

Id. at 861.
Id. at 861-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justices Fitzgerald and Garman.
141 Id. at 862 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146
147

152

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).

153

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Justice Thomas's dissent was joined by
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concentrated on the language that followed in Edmond: "We cannot
sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility
that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has
committed some crime." 154 The dissent felt that this language revealed that
the definition of "general crime control" as55 used in Edmond differed
crucially from the definition that the majority.1
Additionally, the dissent cited a case decided by the Supreme Court of
Virginia with a similar fact pattern to the instant case. 1 56 Burns v.
Commonwealth was the only other reported case decided after Edmond that
addressed the use of roadblocks to locate witnesses and gather information
about a previously-committed crime. 157 In determining whether the
roadblock violated the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of Virginia
distinguished the case from Edmond, reasoning that roadblocks designed to
secure witnesses of a crime already committed and known to the police are
not simply investigating "ordinary criminal wrongdoing."' 58 Instead, the
Supreme Court of Virginia applied the balancing test set forth in Brown and
found that the public interest in solving a murder was advanced by the use
of a roadblock to investigate the crime.' 59 These interests outweighed the
Fourth Amendment interests of private individuals, particularly in light of
the fact that the roadblock was "carried out pursuant to an explicit plan that
contained neutral criteria and limited the discretion and conduct of the law
enforcement officers
charged with the responsibility of stopping vehicles at
160
the roadblock."'
Finally, the dissent advocated application of the balancing test in
Brown v. Texas to show that the checkpoint in Lombard was reasonable and
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.' 61 The dissent noted that
apprehending the perpetrator of a hit-and-run accident was a matter of
public concern, and that the roadblock advanced that concern by aiding in
the investigation of the crime.' 62 Further, by operating the roadblock at the
114
Id. at 862-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 44 (2000)).
155 Id. at 863 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156Bums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001). The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Bums v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001). In Burns, police in Virginia set up a
roadblock shortly after a murder took place in a location close to where it had happened in
order to ask drivers if they had seen the suspect in the area. Burns, 541 S.E.2d at 879.
' Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 864.
158Id.
159Id.
160 id.
161 Id. at 865-66.
162

Id.at 866.
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same time of the accident one week later, the police maximized the
likelihood of locating drivers who routinely traveled along that route and
who may have witnessed the accident. 163 On the other hand, the dissent felt
that the objective intrusion upon private individuals was minimal, as the
roadblock detained them for only ten to fifteen seconds. 164 The subjective
intrusion was also minimal, as the roadblock was carried out in a neutral,
official, "systematic and preestablished manner.', 165
Although the
roadblock may not have been publicized66 or permanent, the basis for the
roadblock was well-known to the public. 1
Lastly, the dissent downplayed the majority's concern that a decision
in favor of the State of Illinois would result in a proliferation of
roadblocks. 67 It pointed out that the relevant crimes which might result in
the need for a roadblock (for example, fatal hit-and-run accidents versus all
68
hit-and-run accidents) make up an extremely small portion of all crimes.1
Additionally, police forces lack the public resources necessary to operate
roadblocks as frequently as the majority suggested. 169 Finally, any
roadblock would still be subject
to the Brown balancing test, as well as the
170
principles set forth in Edmond.
After the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Lombard roadblock
was unconstitutional per Edmond, the state petitioned for and was granted
certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court to resolve whether Edmond properly
171
controlled the instant case.
IV. OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT

A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer reversed the decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, and distinguished the roadblock conducted
by
72
the Lombard police from the drug checkpoints at issue in Edmond.
163

Id.

164Id.

165 Id.at 867.
166
167

Id.
Id.

168 Id.

id.
Id.
171People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855 (Ill.
2002), cert. granted, 538 U.S. 1012 (May 5,
2003) (No. 02-1060).
172 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). Justice Breyer's majority was joined by
169
170

Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg joined as to Parts I and II.
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First, the Court stated that Edmond did not govern the outcome of the
instant case. 173 In essence, the Supreme Court agreed with the dissent in the
Illinois Supreme Court decision and held that there was a distinction
between the Lombard roadblock and the unconstitutional drug checkpoint
in Edmond whose primary purpose was to "detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing." 174 The purpose of the stop in Lombard was "not to
determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime, but to
ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing
information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. 175 The
Supreme Court added that the reasoning in Edmond should not be read to
mean every law enforcement objective, but rather "as referring in context to
circumstances similar to the circumstances then before the Court and not
referring to quite different circumstances that the Court was not then
176
considering."'
The Court went on to specify that, Edmond aside, a lack 177
of
individualized suspicion is not determinative of a constitutional outcome.
As in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte, special law enforcement concerns will
sometimes justify roadblocks without individualized suspicion. 178 The
Court further highlighted the distinctions between Edmond and the instant
case and pointed out that in the context of information-seeking stops such
as the Lombard roadblock, individualized suspicion has little role to play
because suspicion
is not a relevant characteristic of the individuals
179
involved.
Additionally, the Court clarified that law enforcement officers do not
violate the Fourth Amendment merely by asking members of the public to
voluntarily provide information in the investigation of a crime.180 However,
the Court pointed out, the public importance of soliciting information from
members of the public to provide information is "offset to some degree"
because the members of the public solicited in the instant case were
motorists.'18 In this case, there is a difference between soliciting voluntary
information from a pedestrian and a motorist: stopping a motorist for

' Id.at 432.
174Id.(quoting

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,41 (2000)).

175Id
176
177

Id. at 424.

178

id.

id

179Id

at 424-25.

"0Id.
at 425.
'"' Id. at 425-26.
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information amounts to a "seizure"' ' I 2-while a pedestrian could continue
walking and decline the police's request, a motorist is unable to circumvent
the police's overtures. However, the Court held that although these stops
constitute seizures, they do not justify an "Edmond-type rule" because stops
like the one in Lombard
are likely to be brief and may yield important
83
results for the police'
The Court also agreed with the dissent in the Illinois Supreme Court
decision that a failure to apply Edmond to information checkpoints would
not be necessary to prevent a proliferation of checkpoints. 184 The Court
pointed out that a lack of police resources and public opposition would
likely "inhibit" widespread use of roadblocks.' 85
With presumptive unconstitutionality per Edmond written off, the
Court applied the Brown balancing test to determine the constitutionality of
the Lombard roadblocks. 8 6 To do so, the Court weighed the gravity of the
public concern served by the roadblock and the degree to which the
roadblock advanced the public interest against the roadblock's interference
with individual liberties' 8 7 The Court found that the relevant public
concern was significant because the Lombard police were investigating a
hit-and-run death. 8 8 The roadblock advanced the public interest to a
significant degree because the Lombard police tailored the checkpoint by
setting it up near the location 8of
the accident, and at the same time one week
9
place.1
took
accident
after the
The Court, with regards to the severity of the interference with
individual liberties, found minimal objective interference because the stops
were brief, lasting only ten to fifteen seconds. 90 The Court also found that
the subjective interference was minimal because the request for information
about the accident provided little reason for any of the motorists to feel
anxiety or alarm. 191
Based on the Court's finding that Edmond did not apply to the instant
case, and on the outcome of the Brown balancing test, the Supreme Court

182

Id.

183 Id.at 426.
184 Id.
185

Id

186 Id.at 426-27.
"17Id.at 427.
188

Id.

189Id.

190Id.at 427-28.
19'Id.at 428.

SUPREME COURTREVIEW

[Vol. 95

reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois' decision, holding that the roadblock
92
used by Lombard police was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
B. THE DISSENT
Although Parts I and II of the Supreme Court decision (addressing the
factual background of the case and then distinguishing it from Edmond),
received unanimous agreement from the Court, Part III of the decision, in
which the majority outlined and applied the Brown balancing test, did
not. 193 The dissent to Part III of the opinion argued that the Court should
have remanded the case to the Illinois state courts to apply the balancing
194
test because the courts had not used the test in their previous decisions.
The dissent also outlined possible discrepancies in the majority's
application of the test. 95 In terms of the roadblock's ability to advance the
public concern, the dissent questioned how likely the Lombard police
actually were to find witnesses in a random sample of drivers one week
after the accident. 96 Although the police hypothesized that, along with the
accident victim, Pytel, other motorists might be workers leaving their shifts
at the Postal Service sorting facility or other local businesses, there was no
evidence to confirm that the police knew this to be true.' 97 Although it was
a "plausible theory," the roadblock may not have actually captured any
drivers who had been on the road the week before at that time. 198 Further,
the dissent argued that the majority had not considered all of the
possibilities in determining how great the interference of the roadblock
might be on private individuals. 199 In sum, the dissent did not believe the
outcome of the test was clear on the facts of this case.20 0
Since the Illinois appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court found
the Lombard roadblock per se unconstitutional and did not apply the Brown
balancing test, the dissent thought that the majority should have been
reluctant to abandon its role as a court of review "in a case in which the

192

Id.

Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens's opinion
was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
194 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195
Id.(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196 Id. at 429 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197Id.(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198Id.(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193

9 Id.at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 429 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

200
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constitutional inquiry requires analysis of local conditions and practices
more familiar to judges closer to the scene."' 0 '
V. ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY REVERSED THE ILLINOIS
COURTS' DECISIONS BUT SHOULD HAVE REMANDED THE CASE

The Supreme Court was correct in holding that the Lombard roadblock
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court's opinion in
Edmond did not control because the roadblock in that case was
distinguishable from the Lombard roadblock. Further, the Court correctly
applied the same reasoning that it had used in Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz in
holding that reasonable suspicion of the drivers was not required to avoid
presumptive unconstitutionality of the roadblock. The Court also correctly
held that the Brown balancing test should be used to determine the
reasonableness of the roadblock. However, the Court should have
remanded Lidster back to the Illinois courts because neither the Illinois
appellate court nor the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the Brown
balancing test in their majority decisions. As such, the Supreme Court
improperly abandoned its role as reviewer by applying the test and deciding
its outcome when the lower court decisions had not done so previously.
A. THE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED EDMOND
In Edmond, the Supreme Court held that roadblocks set up with the
purpose of "general crime control" were per se unconstitutional, violating
the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonable seizures.2

2

However,

the facts and legal backdrop surrounding Edmond make it clear that the
Supreme Court intended the per se rule to apply only to those checkpoints
designed to detect wrongdoing by the detained motorists.20 3
In Edmond, the Court invalidated checkpoints with the primary
purpose of discovering and interdicting illegal narcotics in the vehicles
passing through the checkpoints, when such seizures occurred without some
degree of individualized suspicion. °4 In holding that such checkpoints
were per se unconstitutional, the Court described the checkpoints as those
meant to "detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and with the
purpose of "general crime control. 20 5 When these phrases are viewed in
isolation, they may be interpreted broadly to encompass checkpoints where
201 Id.(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).

203 Brief for Petitioner at 4-14, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
204 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
201 Id. at 41, 44.
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motorists are stopped for any law enforcement purpose, including
roadblocks like the one in Lidster which sought information from motorists
about a crime previously committed by someone else and also known to the
police.2 °6 However, the context of Edmond demonstrates that "general
crime control" is not meant to include all possible law enforcement
activities, but specifically the circumstances presented in Edmond, in which
officials intended to detect any wrongdoing
specifically by the motorists
20 7
who passed through the checkpoint.
The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, and the Supreme Court
of Illinois erred in incorrectly affixing an impermissibly broad meaning to
the language from Edmond. The Supreme Court recognized that its holding
in Edmond had been misconstrued in reversing the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision, stating that "Edmond's language, as well as its context, makes
clear that the constitutionality of...
[an] information-seeking kind of stop
20 8
was not then before the Court."
Additionally, the Court in Edmond emphasized that its decision to hold
the roadblock unconstitutional turned on the fact that the Indianapolis
checkpoints served only "to advance the general interest in crime
control., 20 9 In doing so, the Court drew a distinction between purposes of
"general interest in crime control" and "law enforcement." The Court
emphatically denied that it was adopting a "non-law-enforcement primary
purpose test" in which all law enforcement checkpoints would be per se
unconstitutional as a result of Edmond.210 Rather, only those law
enforcement checkpoints that served no purpose other than to advance the
general interest in crime control would be per se unconstitutional. 211 When
an information-seeking checkpoint is set up to find witnesses to and
information about an unsolved crime, as the Lombard roadblocks were, the
checkpoint serves law enforcement purposes but does more than simply
advance the general interest in crime control. 12 Because it operates
specifically to solve a crime13 already known to police, it is not per se
unconstitutional per Edmond.

See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.
See id.; see generally Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-44.
208 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424.
209 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (quotations omitted).
210 Id. at 44 n.1; see also Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424.
211 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
212 Brief for Petitioner at 11, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
213 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424.
206

207
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B. INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION IS NOT REQUIRED FOR INFORMATIONSEEKING ROADBLOCKS
Edmond aside, the Supreme Court's previous decisions, particularly
Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz, demonstrate that individualized suspicion is not a
prerequisite to determine the constitutionality of a vehicle checkpoint.214
As the Court noted in Lidster, the fact that vehicle checkpoints generally do
not have individualized
suspicion "cannot by itself determine the
215
outcome.,
constitutional
In his brief to the Court, Lidster argued that any suspicionless vehicle
checkpoint was presumptively in violation of the Fourth Amendment unless
its purpose was roadside safety or border control.2 16 However, this
presumption was clearly erroneous in light of the reasoning behind and
specific language in the two cases to which Lidster alluded-United
States
217
v. Martinez and DepartmentofMichigan Police v. Sitz.
First, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court acknowledged that some amount
of individualized suspicion is "usually" a prerequisite to a constitutional
seizure.218
However, the Court also pointed out that "the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion., 219 This
concept did not first emerge in Martinez-Fuerte-theCourt cited five other
cases that supported its statement.220 The Court went on to hold that
suspicionless vehicle checkpoints used to assist with border control were
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 22 1 As such, the Court's holding
was not only limited to the factual circumstances of Martinez-Fuerte;but
rather, the context of the Court's holding indicates that suspicionless
vehicle checkpoints used for purposes other than border control may also be
constitutional.22 2

In Sitz, the Court rejected the idea that "a showing of some special
governmental need beyond the normal need for criminal law enforcement"
was necessary in order to apply the Brown balancing test to determine a
214

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990); United States v.

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
215 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424.
216

Brief for Respondent at 8, Lidster (No. 02-1060).

217

Id. at 8, 14-15.

218

Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 560.

219

Id. at 561.

220

Id. (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283-85 (1973); United

States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 154 (1925)).
221 id.
222

id.
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checkpoint's reasonableness.223 Further, the Court did find that such needs
would sometimes justify highway stops without any individualized
suspicion. The Court, referring to Martinez-Fuerte, confirmed that this
concept was "in no way" to change how it would handle cases involving
vehicle checkpoints. 224 Again, the reasoning set forth in Martinez-Fuerte
was both reaffirmed by the Court and shown that it would not be limited
only to that case.225
Thus, Lidster's argument was not supported by the cases on which he
relied. 226 While Lidster argued that Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz supported the
notion that suspicionless seizures should only be found to be constitutional
as exceptions to the rule, the Supreme Court cases to which he cited support
the opposite contention. The Supreme Court's language presented in
Martinez-Fuerte and clarified in Sitz very clearly states that individualized
suspicion is never determinative of the constitutionality of any vehicle
checkpoint.227 Here, the fact that the Lombard roadblock did result in
suspicionless seizures of motorists was not at all dispositive as to whether
the roadblock would be found to be constitutional.228
Furthermore, in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court supporting
Illinois, the United States Solicitor General likened information-seeking
vehicle roadblocks to another type of suspicionless seizure that is consistent
with the Fourth Amendment-information-seeking
seizures of
pedestrians. 229 The information-seeking vehicle roadblock is simply an
adaptation of these kinds of seizures in response to the "highly mobile
society" of current times. 230 The Supreme Court, in its majority opinion in
Lidster, did not go far to relate the two types of seizures. 231 The Court
noted that stopping a motorist is more intrusive than stopping a pedestrian,
since the motorist does not have the option to refuse to stop in the way that
a passing pedestrian does.232 However, the Supreme Court found that this
difference
"is not important enough" to find presumptive
unconstitutionality in the absence of individualized suspicion.233

224

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (quotations omitted).
Id.

225

id.

223

Brief of Respondent at 8, Lidster(No. 02-1060).
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450; Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 560-61.
228 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004).
229 Brief of Amicus Curiae for the United States at 11-13, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
230 Id. at 4.
231 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 425.
232 Id. at 425-26.
233 Id. at 426.
226
227

2005]

ILLINOIS v. LIDSTER

C. THE BROWN BALANCING TEST IS THE PROPER METHOD TO
DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OF INFORMATION-SEEKING
ROADBLOCKS
Since the Court found there was no presumptive unconstitutionality of
information-seeking checkpoints, the Supreme Court correctly applied the
Brown balancing test that it had used in Sitz.234 The Court had not yet
23 5 However, Martinezdecided Brown when it decided Martinez-Fuerte.
Fuerte is still relevant because, in that case, the Court balanced the same
factors used in Brown to determine the constitutionality of the border
control checkpoints.23 6 Furthermore, there are additional cases involving
Fourth Amendment issues that have also applied balancing tests-which
were not specifically the Brown test, but closely align with the factors
addressed in Brown-to determine the reasonableness of suspicionless
searches and seizures.237

The Brown balancing test calls for weighing "the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty., 238 Certainly, the interest in solving a hit-and-run accident and
239
apprehending the driver who had killed Pytel is a grave public concern.
In that respect, the first prong of the Brown test is fairly easily satisfied by
the facts of Lidster.240 The second prong of the test considers the means by
which the police advanced the public interest. 241 Here, the Court pointed
-out how the Lombard police "appropriately tailored" the roadblock by
corresponding it with the location of the accident as well as the time at
which the accident had occurred a week earlier 2 42 The Court also
considered testimony from the record in which police officers indicated that
they believed the time of the accident and roadblock coincided with shift
changes at nearby businesses.243
Id. at 426-28.
235 Martinez-Fuertewas decided in 1976. Brown was decided in 1979.
234

236 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1976).

237 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (suspicionless searches); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (roving patrols; decided prior to Brown).
238 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).

239 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427 (2004).
240 Even though it ultimately ruled against the state and did not apply the Brown test, the
Supreme Court of Illinois was sympathetic to the efforts and rationale of the Lombard police
force in trying to apprehend the hit-and-run driver. People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 861

(ill. 2002).
24' Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
242 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427.
243 Id.
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Finally, the Court weighed the interference of the roadblock with
244
individuals' liberties that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect.
Initially, the Court did not specifically articulate the objective and
subjective intrusions into individual liberties in Brown.245 However, in Sitz,
the Court delineated the need to reflect on objective criteria (the duration of
the seizure, any demands made upon individuals, etc.) and subjective
intrusions (fear or alarm that the individual might be subjected to as a result
of the seizure). 246 These sub-elements are an important part of the Brown
balancing test. They guide courts to be more inclusive when they weigh
potential intrusions into Fourth Amendment-protected liberties, considering
those that are manifested and measurable, as well as those that may be
perceived.
Here, in considering the objective intrusions into individual liberties,
the Court looked at the short length of the stop at the Lombard roadblock
and the even shorter period of actual contact with the police.24 7 The police
interaction consisted of a request for information and the distribution of a
flyer. 248 From a subjective perspective, the Court indicated that the stop
should have caused the motorists little anxiety or alarm. 249 All of the
vehicles were stopped systematically and did not involve any
discriminatory treatment of the motorists.25 °
In applying the Brown balancing test in Lidster, the Supreme Court
remained consistent with its previous holdings in vehicle checkpoint
cases. 251 Furthermore, the Court properly addressed the various prongs of
the balancing test, as well as facts of the case that should be considered for
each prong. However, the Court should have stopped its analysis here and
remanded the case back to Illinois, rather than using its application of the
balancing test to simply reverse the Supreme Court of Illinois' decision.

244 Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.

See id. at 47.
Michigan Dept. of Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990).
247 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427-28.
248 Id. at 428.
245

246

249 id.

250
251

Id.
See supra Part II.
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO REMAND
LIDSTER TO THE ILLINOIS COURTS

1. The CourtAbandonedIts Role as a Court of Review
The Court departed from its own practice of remanding reversals to
lower courts in checkpoint cases when it simply reversed the Illinois
Supreme Court's holding in Lidster. Not only did the Court abandon its
"role as a court of review," 252 but its failure to adhere to that role may lead
to confusion when lower courts apply the Brown test in future informationseeking checkpoint cases.
In previous checkpoint cases, the Supreme Court remanded the cases
in which it reversed a lower court's decision. In Martinez-Fuerte, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded each of the three original cases that
had been brought before it (as a consolidated case) in which the Ninth
Circuit had determined that border control checkpoints were
unconstitutional.253 Additionally, in Sitz, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to the Michigan courts after finding that sobriety
checkpoints were constitutional.254 In Edmond, the Supreme Court did not
remand the case because it affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision.255
This is not to say that the Supreme Court did not provide the lower
courts with guidance as to what they should consider upon remand. In both
Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz, the Supreme Court gave very clear and specific
guidelines as to how and why the checkpoints at issue were in fact
constitutional, and upon remand, ordered that the lower courts' decisions
should not be inconsistent with its rulings.256 Arguably, the Court gave
more guidance in those decisions than it did in Lidster-in Martinez-Fuerte
and Sitz, the Court's analyses and applications of the Brown balancing test
were considerably longer and more detailed than in Lidster 7 However,
the Court in Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz still left it to the lower courts to apply
the Brown balancing test and enter decisions of their own.255
In simply reversing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Lidster,
the Court effectively denied the Illinois courts the ability to enter a decision
252 Lidster, 540

U.S. at 429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976). The Court simply
affn-med the Fifth Circuit cases that had already found the stops to be constitutional. Id.
254 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990).
255 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
256 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-55; Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 556-62, 567.
257 Compare Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-55, with Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 556-62. But see
Lidster, 540 U.S. 426-28.
258 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 567.
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using the Brown balancing test and the Court's guidelines. 259 To illustrate
how this practice was neither typical nor appropriate for the Court, Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent: "We do not ordinarily decide in the first
instance issues not resolved below." 260 Despite its departure from the
Court's usual role, the majority opinion provided no reason for its decision
not to remand the case.261 It may have been that the Court wanted to avoid
the risk of the Illinois courts applying the Brown test and finding a balance
against the reasonableness of the roadblock. However, if this were the
reason, the Court could have adhered to its usual role and remanded the
case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion," as it had
done in Sitz.262 On the other hand, this direction would only be upheld to
the extent that the facts presented to the court on remand supported a
balance in favor of the roadblock's constitutionality.263 The Court was
264
correct to illustrate how the facts of the case might be applied to the test.
However, it simply should have allowed the lower court to use the Brown
test in a separate proceeding and enter a decision based on its finding of the
complete facts of the case.
Additionally, this decision may leave courts in other jurisdictions
without clear direction regarding the appropriate type and amount of
evidence to use when determining the reasonableness of informationseeking checkpoints in the future because the Supreme Court's application
of the test was so cursory. 265 The impact in terms of public policy has the
potential to be grave if courts were to begin to use a less fact-intensive
application of the balancing test in future cases involving vehicle
checkpoints on the basis of the Court's decision in Lidster. However, since
the Court's holding is limited to determining whether information-seeking
checkpoints are constitutional, the potential for harm would probably be
limited only to these types of cases, rather than to all vehicle checkpoints.
Nonetheless, a court's failure to conduct a fact-intensive application of the
balancing test could result in decisions that ignore important criteria that
would otherwise affect the constitutionality of information-seeking
checkpoints.

259 See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260

Id. (quoting Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 219, 148 n.10 (2003)) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
261 Id. at 428.
262 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
263 See infra Part V.D.2.
264 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265 Milton Hirsch & David Oscar Markus, Fourth Amendment Forum, CHAMPION, May
28, 2004, at 30.
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2. The Facts Were Not Clear in the Case and Thus RequiredRemand
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the facts of the case may not
have supported an outcome in favor of the reasonableness of the Lombard
roadblock.266 While his hypothetical scenario of a clogged roadway as an
influx of workers getting off their shifts seems somewhat implausible given
the early morning hour during which the roadblock was operated, it still
raises the idea that the Supreme Court was not in the best position to apply
the facts of the case to the test.267 Although it is likely that traffic,
particularly commuter traffic, was sparse on the highway after midnight, it
is possible that the combination of vehicle traffic from shift changes at the
local businesses and general Saturday night traffic from people traveling for
social purposes could have resulted in enough vehicles on the road to create
substantial congestion with the roadblock. By remanding the case, local
judges would have had the ability to better access this kind of information
than the Supreme Court.
First, with regard to the second prong of the Brown test (advancing
public concern) there are two potential issues which were not clearly settled
and should have been decided by the Illinois court on remand. The timing
of the roadblock may or may not have been "tailored" to advance the public
interest concerns served by the roadblock.2 68 On one hand, the roadblock
did take place at the same time of the accident, exactly one week after it
occurred. 269 The Lombard police believed that this might coincide with
shift changes at the nearby factories and plants.27 ° On the other hand, a
considerable length of time had elapsed since the accident.2 7 1 Further,
according to the record, the Lombard police did not have any actual
information regarding shift changes at any of the businesses other than the
Postal Service plant where Pytel worked.272 Since Pytel was traveling by
bicycle, any co-workers who left at the same time but commuted by car
might have passed the accident location long before he did.
Additionally, empirical evidence has played an important role in
demonstrating how particular checkpoints advance public interest

266 Lidster, 540 U.S. 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 428-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 429 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Respondent at 1, Lidster (No.

02-1060).
269 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422.
270 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
271 Brief for Respondent at 1, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
272 Joint Appendix at 28, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
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Although the relative strength of the statistical evidence
presented seems to matter less to the balancing test, the complete absence of
such support has been contemplated as a strong negative factor in the
second prong of the Brown test.274 Here, the State presented no empirical
data to support the effectiveness of information-seeking checkpoints in
leading to the apprehension of criminal suspects. Further, an amicus brief
submitted by the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and the Major
Cities Chiefs Association provided no such support. 275 Although empirical
data alone should probably not be dispositive of the outcome of the
balancing test, its absence in combination with other questionable support
for the second prong of the Brown test may result in a finding for the
Lombard roadblock's unconstitutionality.
The outcome of the third prong of the test (considering a seizure's
interference with personal liberties) may also have been less certain than the
majority indicated in Lidster.2 76 First, the Lombard police indicated that the
stop delayed drivers for ten to fifteen seconds.277 However, this estimate
was based only on the actual interaction between the police officers and the
drivers, when the officers asked drivers if they had any information about
the accident and handed them a flyer.278 It did not take into account the
time that vehicles waited once they approached the roadblock area, but
before they pulled up to a police officer. 279 The facts of the case indicate
that as many as fifteen vehicles may have been waiting in line once they
reached the checkpoint.280 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer did take
this factor into account in the Court's opinion, noting that the wait would be
"a very few minutes at the most. '281 In Martinez-Fuerte,the Court upheld
stops of three-to-five minutes. 282 However, the record for Lidster is not
clear on exactly how long the motorists' delays were. 283 In this case, it was
improper for the Court to base its application of the Brown test on
273 See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 548 (1976).
274 See Sitz, 428 U.S. at 549.
275 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae The Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and

the Major Cities Chiefs Association, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
276 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427-28 (2004).
277 Brief for Petitioner at 8, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
278 id.

Brief for Respondent at 1,Lidster (No. 02-1060).
Joint Appendix at 20, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
281 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427.
282 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1976).
283 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Lidster (No. 02-1060); Brief for Respondent at 1, Lidster
279

280

(No. 02-1060); Joint Appendix at 21, Lidster (No. 02-1060).
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speculation. If the Court had remanded the case, the Illinois courts would
have been in a better position to clarify this information.
Further, both of the Illinois opinions addressed concerns over the
deluge of roadblocks that might result if the Lombard checkpoint were
upheld. 84 Since neither court applied the Brown balancing test, the point
was raised in consideration of public policy. 285 However, when the
Supreme Court applied the Brown test, it made no mention of this
possibility at all. 8 6 Although the dissent in the Illinois Supreme Court
decision pointed out that police resources would be unable to sustain such
widespread use of roadblocks, the fact that this topic was absent from the
Supreme Court's application of the test serves as another indication that the
Court failed to address all of the relevant criteria when it applied the test.287
Lastly, since neither of the Illinois courts had applied the Brown
balancing test in their previous decisions, on remand the court may have
requested additional evidence from the parties to ensure its application of
the test was as informed as possible. Here, the Supreme Court, in
abandoning its usual role as reviewer, made a decision that likely was not
based on all of the relevant evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Supreme Court was correct in holding that informationseeking roadblocks are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Its decision
in Edmond is clearly distinguishable from the Lombard roadblock at issue
in Lidster, and Edmond's application should be limited to those roadblocks
operated for the purpose of "general crime control." The Illinois courts had
been incorrect in extending per se unconstitutionality to informationseeking roadblocks; rather, these roadblocks should be evaluated according
to the reasonableness balancing test set forth in Brown.
However, the Supreme Court should have only offered its application
of the Brown balancing test to the facts of Lidster as guidance for the lower
court upon remand. The Supreme Court erred in simply reversing the case
when the issue had not even been considered in the Illinois courts'
decisions. Doing so was not only uncharacteristic of the Court in
comparison to its previous treatment of vehicle checkpoint cases, but also
improper in light of the Court's traditional function as a court of review.
Further, it was potentially counterproductive for future court decisions on
284 See People v.

2002); People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d
Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 860 (Ill.

419,423 (Il. App. Ct. 2001).
285 Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 423; Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 860.
286 See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426-28.
dissenting).
287 Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 867 (Thomas, J.,
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the issue since the Court provided only a cursory application of the facts to
the balancing test. Despite the fact that Lidster served to clarify and limit
the Supreme Court's holding in Edmond, lower courts may still face
confusion in the future when applying the Brown balancing test to
determine the constitutionality of informational roadblocks.
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